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creates a second set of legal relationships without discharging the
obligations of a former husband.
The court could have elected to adopt the above rationale. Instead, by reviving the doctrine that a bigamous marriage is absolutely
void, the court casts doubt on the rationale of its earlier decisions.
The better solution would appear to be that suggested above. The
result would remain the same, but the court would have avoided
doctrinal inconsistency in the area.
RIcHARD L.

FLETCHER, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE
OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY TRIAL
Parker v. Gladden, 87 Sup. Ct. 468 (1966)
Appellant, whose conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Oregon,' sought post-conviction relief on
the ground that the bailiff's misconduct prejudiced the jury. The
appellant's petition for a new trial was granted by the trial court and
appeal was taken by the state. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed
the order for a new trial,2 holding that the error at trial, even though
3
"reversible, prejudicial or materially affecting the rights of the party,"
was not a sufficient basis upon which to grant post-conviction relief
and that post-conviction relief was not intended to be a delayed appeal. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, reversed and HELD that bailiff's statements to certain jurors
that defendant was a "wicked fellow," that he was guilty, and that
if the defendant were erroneously found guilty the United States
Supreme Court would correct it, violated constitutional guarantees of
trial by impartial jury and confrontation by accusing witnesses. Judgment reversed, Justice Harlan dissenting.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court placed paramount importance on the right of the accused in state courts to a fair trial with
a totally impartial jury under the dictates of the sixth amendment.
In so holding the Court deemphasized the need for finality in verdicts
1. State v. Parker, 285 Ore. 366, 384 P.2d 986 (1963).
2. Parker v. Gladden, 407 P.2d 246 (Ore. 1965).
3. Id. at 247.
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and protection of the jury from post-conviction harassment. These
considerations formed the basis of the Oregon Supreme Court decision4 and Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent.5 The ramifications implicit
in this holding require a fresh look at the approach taken by Florida
courts in similar cases and perhaps a reconsideration of the newlypromulgated Canon 23 of the Florida Code of Ethics Governing Attorneys.6
The instant decision follows a long line of cases which have stressed that in state criminal trials, as well as in federal, those "provision[s] of the Bill of Rights which [are] 'fundamental and essential to a
fair trial' [are] made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 Specifically, the Supreme Court has held these "fundamental requirements of a constitutionally fair trial" 8 to include a trial
in all criminal cases9 in a courtroom presided over by a judge 0 with
the accused having a right to be physically present during prosecution
for a felony (except in viewing the scene of the alleged offense),"
to be represented by counsel, 2 to confront and cross-examine witnesses brought against him,' 3 and to have all evidence developed in
open court from the witness stand 4 and presented according to rules
consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 5
before an unbiased jury free of outside influences. 16
In the principal case the Court required a trial court to grant a
new trial to avert the possibility of prejudice resulting from remarks
1
to the jury. In this holding the Court relied on Turner v. Louisiana, 7
a case in which two deputy sheriffs who were key witnesses for the
prosecution were in "continuous and intimate association" with the
jury during the three-day trial. Although no direct prejudice was
shown and the deputies testified that there had been no conversation
4. Id. at 249.
5. 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 471 (1966).
6. The canon, as amended in June of 1966, concerns attorney-jury relations.
In re Canons of Ethics Governing Attorneys, 186 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1966).
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
8. 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 470 (1966).
9. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948).
10. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
11. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, affirming Commonwealth v.
Snyder, 283 Mass. 401, 185 N.E. 376 (1933).
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400

(1965).
14. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594
(Fla. 1957).
15. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
16. Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956).
17. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
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about the case itself, the Court held that in view of the close association "it would be blinking [at] reality not to recognize the extreme
prejudice inherent in this [situation]."' 8 In the instant case not only
was there mere association with an officer of the court who was prejudiced, but also there was testimony that the bailiff had made statements to certain jurors that were prejudicial, according to the trial
court, and which "'materially affected the rights of the defendant.' "19
In both cases the decision rested on the rights to an impartial jury,
confrontation, and counsel. Turner was based on the due process
standard of fundamental fairness, while the present case utilized the
sixth amendment guarantees of confrontation and impartial jury as
0
applied to the states.2
In reaching the decision in the instant case, however, the Supreme
Court ignored the objections raised by the Oregon Supreme Court
and part of those asserted by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent. In so
doing the Court emphasized the importance, perhaps even the "preferred position," that the guarantee of an impartial jury trial has
attained under the Constitution as presently interpreted by a majority
of the Court.21 As Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent,
Parker and his wife, without any reason to suspect the existence of
irregularity, wrote and interviewed jurors in an attempt to establish
grounds for a new trial during both the time that his first trial was on
appeal and after his conviction had been affirmed. 22 Further, the testimony was not that actual prejudice resulted from the bailiff's comments to some jurors,23 but only that his remarks might have been
prejudicial.
The Oregon Supreme Court had distinguished Turner by saying
18. Id. at 473.
19. 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 471 (1966).
20. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) had previously applied the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the states.
21. For its decision, the Oregon Supreme Court relied in part on the Oregon
post-conviction statutes. ORE. R:v. STAT. §§138.550, .530 (1965). Mr. justice
Harlan based his dissent in part on his refusal to apply the sixth amendment to
the states. Parker v. Gladden, 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 472 (1966). Neither basis need be
considered here, since the statutory requirement for a new trial only for deprivation of constitutional rights was met by the majority Supreme Court decision,
and Mr. justice Harlan is presently alone in his contention that the sixth
amendment does not apply to state action.
22. 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 471 (1966).
23. One juror testified: "[A]l in all it [the bailiff's comments] must have
influenced me. I didn't realize it at the time." 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 470 n.3 (1966)
(dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Harlan noted she [the juror] denied any influence whatsoever when first examined and later admitted she "would do anything short of committing perjury to overturn it [the decision]." Parker v.
Gladden, supra at 473 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
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that "the difference in degree of the out-of-courtroom influence is so
great ' ' 24 as to make Turner inapplicable. Mr. Justice Harlan extended
this argument by adding that the Court has never insisted on jurors
being "absolutely insulated from all expressions of opinion on the
merits of the case or the judicial process, ' ' 25 that the evidence of prejudice was "extremely trivial," and that the Court should require "a
substantial showing of prejudice . ..before a due process violation
can be found." 26 Mr. Justice Harlan revealed implications of the majority's holding by observing: "[Tihe Court's opinion leaves open the
possibility of automatically requiring a mistrial on constitutional
grounds whenever any juror is exposed to any potentially prejudicial
expression of opinion."27
Both Mr. Justice Harlan and the Oregon Supreme Court attacked
the petition for new trial on the ground that it would permit and
encourage after-trial harassment of jurors by the convicted defendant
or his attorney. The Oregon Supreme Court suggested that the need
for finality in verdicts and for protection of jurors from harassment
should be assessed with the guarantee of a fair trial to determine if
a new trial should be granted. 28 Mr. Justice Harlan cited the established policy of the Court "to protect the sanctity of the jury process," 29 and keep jurors from intimidation and harassment. He warned
that others will be encouraged to follow Parker's example in pursuing
the jury.
In the present case then, the majority of the Court is looking
only to the circumstances of the trial itself, and in order to secure
an absolutely impartial jury trial under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, would grant a new trial where any possibly prejudicial
remarks have been overheard by some of the jury. On the other hand,
the Oregon Supreme Court and Mr. Justice Harlan look to the degree
of actual prejudice that has been shown, thereby establishing a rebuttable presumption of integrity as to the jury's deliberations. This
presumption is needed, in their view, to assure finality in decisions3°
and to protect jurors from possible post-conviction harassment.31 They
24. Parker v. Gladden, 407 P.2d 246, 249 (Ore. 1965).
25. 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 472 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Parker v. Gladden, 407 P.2d 246, 249 (Ore. 1965).
29. 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 473 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
30. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); McDonald v. Pless,
238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915).
31. See, e.g., Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657, 665 (C.A. Cal. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957); Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948); United States v. Provenzano, 240 F.
Supp. 393, 412-13 (D.N.J. 1965); United States v. Holmes, 183 F. Supp. 361, 363
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require that actual prejudice, determinative in the final conviction,
be shown before a new trial is granted.
Thus, the majority holding, so interpreted, has two significant
implications for state criminal proceedings in Florida. First, as to
the probability of prejudice necessary for a new trial, the present case,
32
taken with Turner, requires that the harmless error rule in Florida
be strictly limited to cases where, in the trial judge's discretion, no
prejudice was possible; not because of statutory provisions, 33 nor because of precedent, 34 nor because of a vague requirement for "fairness"
in court procedure,3 5 but because of the overriding demands of the
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Since the standard of granting a new trial where there is possible prejudice resulting
from remarks tending to be prejudicial will be applied in the sound
discretion of the trial judge,3 6 the outcome will not be affected in a
case, for example, where no new trial was granted because no actual
prejudice or prejudicial remarks were shown, and defendant waived
his objection to the bailiff's being a prosecution witness. 3 Also, no
new trial would be required where the prejudicial remarks did not
reach the jury.3 8 Furthermore, the outcome will remain the same
where a new trial is necessitated by a showing of actual prejudice.3 9
In cases where prejudice is possible or in doubt, however, there is
now a firm constitutional basis for granting a new trial.
Second, regarding appellant's post-conviction interviews, the Supreme Court's refusal, in the face of the specific objections of the
(E.D.S.C. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960).
32. North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952), aff'd, 346 U.S. 932 (1954).
33. A new trial was ordered in Holzapfel v. State, 120 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1960),
based on FLA. CONsr. Decl. of Rights §11 (fair and impartial trial guaranteed) and
FLA. STAT. §§918.07 (bailiff shall prevent communication with jury), 919.05 (jury
may return to courtroom for instructions), 920.05 (1) (a) (grounds for new trial
if criminal defendant is not present when required) (1965). See also FLA. STAT.
§§920.04 (grounds for new trial if substantial rights are prejudiced), 920.05 (1) (b)
(grounds for new trial if jury receives evidence out of court) (1965).
34. Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 385-86, 388-89 (Fla. 1959) distinguished North
v. State, 65 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952) and held that in a capital case if the trial record
does not show the absence of prejudice resulting from improper remarks of the
prosecuting attorney, a new trial must be granted.
35. See State ex tel. Larkins v. Lewis, 54 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1951). However,
both State ex tel. Larkins v. Lewis, supra, and Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla.
1959) granted new trials when a doubt existed as to possible prejudice, even
though they were not decided on the constitutional grounds used in the present
case.
36. North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952), afl'd, 346 U.S. 932 (1954).
37. Moseley v. State, 60 So. 2d 167 ( Fla. 1952).
38. McVeigh v. State, 73 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S.
886 (1954).
39. Owens v. State, 68 Fla. 154, 67 So. 39, 40 (1914).
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Oregon Supreme Court and the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan, to
condemn or even to discuss the possibly undesirable effects of postconviction probing of the jury when there is no reason to suspect any
irregularity in the proceedings, seems to imply that the right to question jurors after trial is absolute. If this interpretation is correct, the
newly-promulgated Canon 23 of the Florida Code of Ethics Governing
Attorneys-"Relations with Jury" is unconstitutional insofar as it requires "reason to believe that ground for such challenge may exist"40
and establishes restrictions on the scope of the interview.
It is, however, unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to permit unrestrained harassment or intimidation of jurors after trial by
any convicted defendant, since even possibly prejudicial remarks are
seldom made to the jury, and the danger of harassment of the jurors
and jury tampering would be ever present. On the other hand, the
present case does indicate that the showing of probable cause is too
restrictive as a prerequisite for after-trial interviews with the jury.
When possibly prejudicial remarks reach the jury after deliberations
have begun, there is no way (other than post-conviction interview)
for the accused to discover the possibility of prejudice before or after
verdict unless there is a voluntary admission by a juror or the one
who made the statements. Clearly, when such remarks have been
made, the right to interview jurors after trial is crucial to insure the
impartiality of the proceedings, and Canon 23 should not shield the
possible prejudice from exposure by counsel for the accused.- In the
light of the present decision, therefore, Canon 23 should perhaps be
modified to establish only procedural limitations (such as notice to
opposing counsel and the court, and restrictions as to the time and
40. FLORIDA CODE OF ETHICS GOVERNING ATTORNEYS, Canon 23, as amended
June 15, 1966, provides in part as follows: "Subject to any limitations imposed
by law it is a lawyer's right, after the jury has been discharged, to interview the
jurors solely to determine whether their verdict is subject to any legal challenge
provided he has reason to believe that ground for such challenge may exist, and

further provided that prior to any such interview made by him or under his
direction, he shall file in the cause, and deliver a copy to the trial judge and
opposing counsel, a notice of intention to interview such juror or jurors setting
forth in such notice the name of each such juror. The scope of the interview
should be restricted and caution should be used to avoid embarrassment to any
juror and to avoid influencing his action in any subsequent jury service." Emphasis added.)
41. It is unlikely that the rationale of the present decision will be held inapplicable to Canon 23 of the Florida Code of Ethics Governing Attorneys solely
because the defendant Parker, who made the interviews, was not an attorney, since
it would be more desirable whenever possible to have any post-conviction inquiries
made by counsel, responsible to the court and the bar, rather than by the defendant, who may conduct his questioning with less restraint or consideration for the
jurymen.
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